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ABSTRACT 
Prior research has examined the effects of ethnic fractionalization on trust in 
political institutions. However, most of the literature focuses on a general understanding of 
political trust, disregarding the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and individual 
trust in the legal system. I argue that high levels of ethnic fractionalization decrease trust 
in the courts. To provide empirical support for my theory, I use individual-level survey 
data from 32 African and Latin American countries from 2013 and I produce two findings. 
First, using multiple OLS fixed effects regression analysis, I find that ethnic 
fractionalization decreases trust in the courts. Second, using mediation analysis, I find that 
ethnic fractionalization indirectly decreases trust in the courts through the mediation effect 
of corruption. Consequently, ethnic fractionalization is essential to understanding trust in 
the courts and democratic institutions in general.
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ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION, CORRUPTION, AND TRUST IN THE COURTS  
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War brought democratization throughout the world in 
countries that were not traditionally democratic. In many of the countries, there are high 
levels of ethnic fractionalization. This is an issue because the extant literature suggests 
that high levels of ethnic fractionalization pose challenges to favorable political and 
economic outcomes (Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Habyarimana et 
al., 2007). The findings on the effects of ethnic fractionalization (EF)—measured by the 
probability that two randomly drawn individuals within a country do not share the same 
ethnicity—on various political and economic outcomes have yielded an unfortunate yet 
significant pattern regarding ethnic diversity. High levels of EF associate with increased 
ethnic favoritism, higher levels of corruption, and reduced institutional performance 
(Hutchison and Johnson, 2011; Lavallé et al., 2008; Newton, 2007; Touchton, 2013). In 
economics, higher levels of EF have been associated with poor economic growth, lower 
levels of income, and higher levels of income inequality (Chi et al., 2013; Newton, 2007; 
Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). Considering these negative consequences, high levels of EF 
also associate with decreased levels of political trust. 
While clear implications from prior research bring to light the challenges between 
high levels of diversity and political trust in general, there are no studies that examine the 
effects of EF on trust in the courts and judicial systems at large. That this gap even exists 
is surprising because there are studies illustrating how EF affects judicial outcomes. For 
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example, prior research suggests that Arabic judges impose preferential treatment to Arab 
criminal defendants in Israel (Grossman et al., 2016), while Constitutional Court judges 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina conspicuously vote along clear ethnic lines (Schwartz and 
Murchison, 2016). If this is the case, combined with prior findings on the effects of EF on 
political institutions, EF may have a negative impact on trust in the courts. To fill this 
gap, I study the effects of ethnic fractionalization on individual levels of trust in the 
courts. 
Thus, in this study, I particularly examine the relationship between levels of 
ethnic fractionalization and individual-level trust in the courts. This undertaking is 
important because it can inform policymakers of the various determinants that influence 
individuals in trusting judicial institutions. By understanding the role of ethnicity in 
generating trust in the legal system among citizens, judicial institutions in highly 
ethnically diverse contexts can shape policy according to the particular needs of 
minorities and groups that are most affected by the status quo. Finally, as a result, when 
such measures generate higher levels of trust in the courts and the legal system in general, 
citizens will carry over high trust and confidence into other political institutions and 
democracy in general. 
In this thesis, I argue that ethnic fractionalization has two primary effects on trust 
in the judicial system. First, EF has a direct negative effect on trust in the courts. 
Individuals in countries with higher levels of EF should exhibit lower levels of trust in 
the courts because of ethnic favoritism. Ethnic favoritism is preferential treatment along 
ethnic lines and it occurs, for example, when judges impose lighter sentences to criminal 
defendants within the same ethnic group than to defendants in the minority ethnic groups.  
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Second, EF has an indirect negative effect on trust in the courts through corruption. Prior 
research suggests that high levels of EF are associated with increased corruption 
(Cerqueti et al., 2012), and higher levels of corruption are associated with decreased 
levels of trust in political institutions in general (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009; Lavallée et 
al., 2008; Newton, 2007). In ethnically fractionalized countries, ethnic identity operates 
as another motivator for corruption but along ethnic lines. For example, a judge may 
disregard the law and resolve a dispute according to the wishes of the judge’s nationalist 
appointing party as a favor for the appointment. As a result, I expect that corruption will 
mediate the effect of EF on the courts and produce an indirect negative impact on trust. 
To provide support for my expectations, I analyze 32 democratic countries from 
Africa and Latin America using the Afrobarometer and the Latinobarometer individual-
level surveys from 2013. Using a multiple OLS fixed effects regression analysis, I 
produce two major findings. First, I find that EF has a direct negative effect on trust in 
the courts. Individuals in countries with higher levels of EF are substantially less likely to 
exhibit trust in courts than individuals in less fractionalized countries. Second, EF has an 
indirect negative effect on trust in the courts through a mediation effect of corruption. I 
confirm findings from prior research showing that EF increases corruption and that 
corruption decreases political trust, but I add to existing research by finding that EF has 
an indirect effect through corruption.  
In the first section, I analyze the extant literature on EF and trust in courts and 
outline my theoretical expectations. Then, I describe my data, methods, and the primary 
variables and hypotheses. The third section examines the results for my primary 
hypothesis and meditation hypotheses. The last section concludes the paper. 
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Determinants of Trust in the Courts 
The current literature on individual political trust has identified several factors 
that influence trust in political institutions in general. Scholars typically tend to 
emphasize how various political and economic indicators—increased corruption, poor 
institutional legitimacy, low national wealth, and high income inequality—tend to 
negatively associate with political trust (Alesina et al., 2003; Karakoç, 2013; Keefer and 
Knack, 2000; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). For example, a common finding within the 
political context illustrates how corruption reduces citizens’ trust in political institutions 
(Newton, 2007). When citizens perceive and experience corruption with government 
authorities, they lose confidence in the political system because they operate under the 
belief that bribery supersedes the law (Lavallé et al., 2008). This leads to citizens taking 
matters into their own hands and resorting to self-help methods in resolving legal 
disputes and obtaining access to public goods (Listhaug and Ringdal, 2008; Marien and 
Hooghe, 2011). However, findings on EF and trust typically focus on a broad, general 
understanding of political trust. 
Another factor that could influence trust in in political institutions is ethnic 
fractionalization. In examining the effects of EF, most research emphasizes how high 
levels of EF tend to produce a negative outlook on the rule of law (Karakoç, 2013; 
Touchton, 2013). This line of literature argues that minorities operate under the belief 
that political institutions no longer represent their interests, so there is no incentive to 
exhibit trust in the political system.  
While previous research suggests that EF has a negative effect on trust in political 
institutions in general, few studies have focused on how EF affects judicial institutions 
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specifically. This is surprising given that most research focuses on how ethnicity and race 
affect legal outcomes and whether diverse court composition affects sentencing in 
criminal cases.1 For the former, studies illustrate how defendants within the ethnic 
minority groups receive harsher sentences and are more likely to get incarcerated than 
defendants in the ethnic majority group (Abrams et al., 2012; Grossman et al., 2016). For 
the latter, studies have found that courts with diverse ethnic compositions vote along 
obvious ethnic lines (Schwartz and Murchison, 2016). This thesis addresses this gap by 
investigating the negative effects of EF on trust in the courts in Africa and Latin America. 
By focusing particularly on the relationship between EF and citizens’ trust in courts, this 
thesis seeks to make a theoretical contribution to existing literature on ethnic diversity 
and political outcomes in the context of courts and law.  
Why Trust Matters 
It is generally understood that democratic institutions should consist of formal and 
transparent rules that are publicly understood and respected, and that these institutions 
should operate on behalf of the public good (Askvik et al., 2010; Devos et al., 2002). The 
authorities that control these institutions should also refrain from using their positions of 
power for personal gain. When these conditions are met, individuals tend to exhibit 
greater trust in and compliance with institutions (Gibson, 1989). When individuals have 
                                                 
1 See Abrams (2012) and Grossman et al. (2016) for how judges within different ethnic groups sentence 
criminal defendants. See also Schwartz and Murchison (2016) for general examples of ethnic favoritism in 
ethnically divided societies.  
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trust in these institutions, they believe that the institution, as a collective entity, is 
competent, reliable, fulfills its obligation, and acts responsibly (Devos et al., 2002).  
Similarly, trust in the courts is necessary for the judicial system to function. When 
individuals exhibit trust in the courts it makes it easier for the legal system to function 
because trust promotes popular support for the courts (Askvik et al., 2010; Marien and 
Hooghe, 2011). Popular support reduces resistance to the courts and legal authorities, 
making it easier to interpret and uphold the law. Additionally, trust increases the ability to 
ensure that citizens comply with the law, which results in lowered transaction costs by 
reducing the need for vigilante justice and extrajudicial methods of dispute resolution. 
Trustworthy citizens are also more likely to support allocating public resources towards 
the courts’ policy goals, reducing the costs of garnering public support (Marien and 
Hooghe, 2011). 
When citizens exhibit higher levels of trust and confidence in the judicial system, 
courts are also more likely to abide by the democratic principles of accountability and 
due process, increasing the ability to protect citizens from unrestrained executive and 
enforcement agencies that exercise excessive policing authority (Bandes, 1999; 
Dougherty et al., 2006). For example, Brinks (2006) provides evidence showing how 
courts in Latin America that check the powers of the executive—Argentina and 
Uruguay—have substantially higher police homicide prosecution rates than courts in 
Brazil, where courts are less likely to uphold such prosecutions.  
These positive attributes lead to increased diffuse support among citizens—
positive attitudes and beliefs towards the court’s general institutional legitimacy (Gibson 
et al., 1998). Diffuse support is achieved over time through consistent positive court 
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output and commitment to democratic values. The relationship can be self-reinforcing 
through increased levels of trust between citizens and the judicial system, leading to 
increased legitimacy (Tyler and Huo, 2002). Citizens are more likely to welcome policy 
changes from institutions they perceive as legitimate than illegitimate ones (Nelson and 
Gibson, 2017). 
In contrast, distrustful citizens are more likely to perceive the courts as an 
extension of elite power designed to subjugate them rather than institutions designed to 
protect their interests (Tyler and Huo, 2002). This results in increased costs of 
enforcement because courts must utilize additional enforcement mechanisms and other 
agencies to improve compliance with the law (Karakoç, 2013). Classic examples of how 
distrust increases costs of legal compliance are tax evasion and fraud (Marien and 
Hooghe, 2011). Citizens that distrust the courts are more likely to accept illegal 
permissive behavior, avoid paying taxes, and commit fraud. By evading taxes, citizens 
engage in free-riding practices, which can result in lost resources for governments to use 
in upholding the rule of law. 
In addition, when citizens perceive the judiciary as distrustful, they are more 
likely to circumvent the law and seek alternative methods to dispute resolution 
(Dougherty et al., 2006; Cott, 2006: Marien and Hooghe, 2011; Tyler and Huo, 2002). 
Cott (2006) elaborates this point in the context of informal institutions in Latin America. 
For example, as a result of ineffective and corrupted courts in Peru, citizens formed 
informal policing institutions as an alternative to Peru’s formal legal system. Such 
alternative methods produced deleterious consequences, including cruel punishment, 
torture, subversion for the rule of law, and death (Cott, 2006). 
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Given that institutional trust is essential for the functioning of the judicial system, 
it is important to identify the factors that influence institutional trust. Yet what determines 
trust consists of a multitude of factors. Most previous research highlights a common set 
of predictors that determine institutional trust. In particular, some studies focus on how 
specific political indicators influence institutional trust, such as corruption, confidence in 
political institutions, and support for democracy (Newton, 2007; Tan and Tambyah, 
2011). Other studies focus on how economic indicators such as national wealth and 
income inequality influence trust (Chi et al., 2013; Newton, 2007; Zmerli and Castillo, 
2015). In this analysis, I break from this line of literature by specifically analyzing the 
relationship of ethnic fractionalization (EF) on trust in the courts. I expect EF to have a 
negative impact on trust in the courts 
The Effect of Ethnic Fractionalization on the Trust in the Courts 
Below, I analyze two ways in which ethnic fractionalization negatively impacts 
trust in the courts. First, I analyze the direct effects of EF on trust in the courts through 
ethnic favoritism. Ethnic favoritism occurs when authorities within the legal system at 
large show preferential treatment towards individuals within the same ethnic group. For 
example, there is extensive literature on systematic ethno-racial biases in criminal 
sentencing within the U.S. legal system, where there is one large majority (Caucasian) 
and multiple minority groups. In such cases, no reciprocity is required and the favoritism 
need not be intentional. In contrast, the second way in which EF influences trust in the 
courts is indirectly through corruption. In such cases, legal authorities show preferential 
treatment to individuals within the same ethnic group but expect reciprocity through 
some material means—money, favors, gifts, etc. Unlike the direct effect, the indirect 
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effect through corruption is intentional and goes beyond mere favoritism. I expect that the 
perceived favoritism within the judicial context increases as the number of ethnic groups 
within countries increases. For the remainder of this section, I outline some examples that 
highlight the distinction between the direct and indirect effects of EF on trust in the 
courts. 
Direct Effects of Ethnic Favoritism on Trust in the Courts 
Previous research suggests that ethnic minorities cease to trust political 
institutions because they operate under the belief that their interests are not adequately 
represented in those institutions based on how those political institutions cater to their 
needs and their individual experiences during interactions with political authorities 
(Karakoç, 2013). For example, Karakoç (2013) tests whether Turkish Kurds—the ethnic 
minority in Turkey—exhibit lower levels of institutional trust than the majority Turks. 
The author presents evidence showing that the minority Kurds exhibit lower levels of 
trust in legal institutions, the police, and the parliament than the majority Turks based on 
ethnicity.2  
This finding is not surprising and is common across the globe. Tan and Tambyah 
(2011) present evidence illustrating that ethnic homogeneity increases institutional trust 
in Confucian Asia. People in homogeneous countries, like South Korea, exhibited the 
highest levels of trust because a majority of them identified with a single ethnic identity. 
                                                 
2 In a trust index ranging from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest), Kurds scored a 5.45 in trust for legal institutions 
compared to 6.38 among Turks; 5.24 in trust for police compared to 6.57 among Turks; and 5.57 in trust for 
parliament compared to 5.90 among Turks (Karakoç 2013, 100-107). 
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In contrast, Vietnamese citizens were the least trusting because the majority of 
individuals did not identify with any particular ethnic identity. Hutchison and Johnson 
(2011) present evidence illustrating that high ethnic diversity is negatively associated 
with political trust in Africa because ethnic tensions exacerbate conflict and negatively 
affect regime stability. And Delhey and Newton (2005) present evidence from a global 
study showing that ethnic fractionalization significantly reduces trust between people 
while the homogeneous Nordic countries exhibit high levels of trust. In diverse countries, 
people trust less in others based on ethnic differences. In contrast, the authors argue that 
homogeneous countries exhibit higher levels of trust between individuals because people 
tend to trust others that identify with the same ethnic group. 
The lack of trust in the courts among minority groups is not surprising given that 
judicial outcomes differ for ethnic minorities. Using panel data from appeal cases in 
Israel, Grossman et al. (2016) present evidence showing that in cases where the judge and 
the criminal defendant share the same ethnicity—Arab judges and defendants in Israel—
there is a 14-20% reduction in incarceration rates and a 15-26% reduction in prison 
sentencing. Similar ethnic favoritism patterns emerge in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). 
Schwartz and Murchison (2016) elaborate this point in a study analyzing Bosnian 
Constitutional Court decisions from 1997-2013. The authors present evidence showing 
that judges frequently voted according to obvious ethnic lines. Focusing on linear 
patterns between the petitioners and the judges, their study illustrates that ethno-national 
preferences and affiliations are clear and substantial predictors of the court’s ethnic 
division and behavior (Schwartz and Murchison, 2016). 
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In the American context, prior research has consistently presented data illustrating 
ethnic bias in sentencing practices (Abrams et al., 2012; Curry and Corral-Camacho, 
2008; Feldmeyer and Ulmer, 2011; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000).  Steffensmeier and 
Demuth (2000) present evidence illustrating that white defendants receive preferential 
treatment in federal cases where judges use the federal sentencing guidelines. Using court 
documents compiled by the U.S. Sentencing Commission for the years 1993-1996, the 
authors find that Hispanic defendants received harsher sentences than white defendants. 
Additionally, Abrams et al. (2012) provide evidence showing that ethnic minorities are 
incarcerated at higher rates than whites. Finally, Dougherty et al. (2006) present evidence 
showing that Hispanics and African Americans exhibit less trust in the judiciary than 
Caucasians in Georgia (U.S.). 
Disparaging treatment in legal outcomes generates negative citizen-level 
perceptions regarding the judiciary. Using pooled cross-sectional, time-series data from 
55 developing countries, Touchton (2013) presents evidence showing that high levels of 
EF undermine perceptions for the rule of law. He argues that ethnic tensions may inhibit 
political legitimacy and institutional credibility because political actors favor ethnic 
identity over national identity and exoteric policy outcomes. Specifically, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to credibly commit to the rule of law when leading political actors 
within the dominant ethnic group exhibit ethnic bias at the expense of the minority 
ethnicities. As a result, individuals may become less likely to have trust in judicial 
institutions (Keefer and Knack, 2000). As such, as ethnic fractionalization increases, I 
expect trust in the courts to decrease. 
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It is important to distinguish how ethnic fractionalization operates in a context 
where there is one large majority ethnic group and a few minority groups, to a context 
where there are multiple minority groups without a clear majority group. In the former 
case, there is clear ethnic favoritism within the judicial system, but the members of the 
main ethnic group may not perceive the favoritism. Within their position of power, 
members of the majority group may not be aware that they are giving preferential 
treatment to members of their own ethnicity at the expense of members of the minority 
group because they simply do not observe it. Thus, members of the majority ethnicity 
operate under the belief that the legal system is fair and equal among all groups. As a 
result, in this type of system, individuals should exhibit higher levels of trust in the 
courts. 
In the latter case—countries with multiple minority groups and no clear majority 
group—members of all the groups can be both the beneficiary and the victim of ethnic 
favoritism, meaning that most people have the opportunity to experience ethnic 
favoritism at some point. As a result, most individuals in this system should exhibit 
relatively low levels of trust in the courts. Therefore, I expect that higher levels of ethnic 
fractionalization should negatively impact levels of trust in the courts.  
One final point worth discussing is the potential effect of ethnic group size. 
Though outside of the scope of this article, some research suggests that group size can 
affect economic development, civil conflict, changes in policy preferences, and political 
participation (Choi and Kim, 2018; Dimico, 2017; Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999; Wimmer 
et al., 2009). This line of research is beyond the study of judicial institutions. However, it 
is not a large leap to expect that perceptions of fairness in the judicial system might vary 
13 
 
 
for individuals in countries where the groups are virtually the same size in contrast to 
countries where one group is severely outnumbered. Additionally, perceptions might also 
vary depending on whether the minority ethnicity is the politically dominant group. 
However, empirical evidence illustrating concrete patterns is mixed—some is even 
conflicting (Eifert et al., 2010; Fearon et al., 2007; McCauley, 2014). As such, I leave this 
point for future research.  
Indirect Effects of Ethnic Favoritism on Trust in the Courts through Corruption 
While EF may directly influence trust in judicial institutions, it may also have an 
indirect influence on trust in the courts through its impact on corruption. As I discuss 
more below, EF has a positive effect on corruption (Cerqueti et al., 2012), and corruption 
has a negative effect on trust in judicial institutions (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009; 
Lavallée et al., 2008; Newton, 2007). Cerqueti et al. (2012) confirm prior findings on the 
positive association between EF and corruption. In ethnically diverse societies, there is 
more opportunity for an increased number of bribe-takers since each ethnic group is 
responsible for different regions and agencies within the political power structure. Freitag 
and Bühlmann, (2009) present evidence showing that when individuals perceive political 
institutions as incorruptible, they are more likely to exhibit political trust in general and 
in other people. Finally, Lavallée et al. (2008) present evidence showing that individuals 
in Sub-Saharan Africa that either experienced or perceived corruption exhibited 
substantially lower levels of trust in political institutions because they operate under the 
belief that they have to pay a premium for access to public services and that the 
corruption is an indicator of institutional failure. 
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Corruption, or the use of public office for personal gain, has a strong negative 
impact on judicial institutions. It is not uncommon that judges, like ordinary politicians, 
take bribes in the forms of money or gifts from attorneys with pending cases, rich 
business owners, and members of other branches of the government (Buscaglia and 
Dakolias, 1999; Wallace, 1998). In Brazil, for example, corruption was a widely common 
practice across the entire judicial system prior to system-wide judicial reforms in the 
early 2000’s. Corrupt courts refused to check the executive branch, leading to thousands 
of extrajudicial killings of citizens by local police forces (Brinks, 2006). In some cases, 
such killings were even rewarded. In Bosnia, similar patterns of corruption emerge. 
Judges often accepted bribes in exchange of leniency in sentencing and granting 
favorable case dispositions (IJC, 2004). In Bijeljina, a network of bribery within the 
courts was uncovered. 24 judges and prosecutors engaged in collecting weekly bribes for 
early release from detention, acquittals, agreements for prosecutors not to appeal cases, 
and lighter sentences. The weekly bribes amounted to over $27,000.00 per week (IJC, 
2004).3 When members of the judicial system use their office for personal gain, such 
practices increase costs by delaying regular cases and favoring wealthy and politically 
connected parties. Corruption in the courts inhibits the ability of governments to address 
crime and increases costs of social development by discriminating against the poor 
(Buscaglia and Dakolias, 1999; Shen et al., 2013).  
                                                 
3 Other examples include judges extorting court employees; money laundering; imposing lenient sentencing 
to high profile drug dealers; and deliberately delaying cases in order to dismiss without a hearing (Taylor 
2005; Zimmerman 2012). 
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Data that illustrates cases in which ethnicity played a major role in corruption is 
not as common as the direct effects cases since the distinction is not as obvious. 
However, there are cases in which ethnicity played the decisive role in corruption and 
reciprocity was expected—an indirect effect. In Bosnia, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) referred multiple war crime cases to a lower 
Cantonal Court (ICJ, 2004). The composition panel for the Cantonal Court was legally 
required to represent multi-ethnicity among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Major 
nationalist parties from each ethnicity appointed the judges. It was later reported that it 
became obvious that there were clear agreements between certain judges and appointing 
nationalist parties on the outcome of the cases. Almost all the defendants were acquitted 
and those found guilty received preferential treatment evident in the lenient sentences 
(IJC, 2004).  
Ethnic corruption between the appointing executive party and the appointed 
judges is another consequence of EF’s indirect effect on the courts. In Bosnia, judges 
commonly issued orders according to approaches more favorable to their appointing 
political parties (IMF, 2017). Similarly, any efforts to reform Serbia’s legal system from 
the 2000’s and onwards were marred by ethnic corruption (IMF, 2017). Constant political 
influence over the appointment and selection of judges was common. Collusion between 
judges and the appointing party was routine since political parties constantly sought 
control over the judiciary. Such measures not only evince ethnically influenced 
corruption where reciprocation is obvious, but also undermine democratic principles of 
judicial independence and impartiality.  
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When citizens perceive and experience clear and obvious corruption within the 
courts, their levels of trust decrease significantly. When individuals must bribe the courts 
with money or favors to receive a favorable outcome, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
them to believe that the legal system is legitimate and accountable. If money buys justice, 
then what purpose does equality under the law serve? Similarly, when individuals are 
victims of corruption through ethnic favoritism, it become increasingly difficult to 
believe that courts operate under the democratic principles of equality under the law.  
In this vein, I formulate three hypotheses. First, I expect to confirm prior findings 
that show that high levels of EF increase corruption. Second, I expect to confirm prior 
findings that illustrate that high levels of corruption reduce institutional trust—trust in the 
courts in this case. Finally, for the mediation effect, I expect that high levels of EF should 
indirectly reduce trust in the courts through mediation of corruption. To summarize my 
theoretical expectations, I formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: As ethnic fractionalization increases, trust in courts decreases. 
Hypothesis 2a: As ethnic fractionalization increases, corruption increases. 
Hypothesis 2b: As corruption increases, trust in courts decreases. 
Hypothesis 2c: Corruption partially mediates the effect of ethnic fractionalization 
on trust in courts. 
Data and Methods 
Trust in the Courts 
To test my hypotheses, I use Trust in the Courts as my dependent variable 
gathered through individual-level surveys. The first survey was the Afrobarometer and it 
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included 16 African democracies4 that scored at least a 6 on the POLITY IV measure. 
The second survey was measured through the Latinobarometer databases from 2013. It 
included 16 Latin American countries5 that also scored at least a 6 on the POLITY IV 
measure. I use a multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed effects regression.  
I selected Africa and Latin America for my analysis for multiple reasons. First, as 
I go into more depth below, these surveys yield great variation on the primary variables. 
The raw data show, to my surprise, that over one-third of individuals in the 16 African 
countries exhibit a lot of trust in the courts. Conversely, approximately the same amount 
of Latin Americans indicate that they do not trust the courts at all. Additionally, there is 
great variation in ethnic fractionalization in the two regions. The African codebook lists 
over 2,000 different ethnic groups for respondents to choose from and the 
Latinobarometer codebook lists 7 (Afrobarometer, 2013; Latinobarometer, 2013). 
Second, these surveys are some of the most commonly used within social science studies 
that analyze anything from individual assets to infrastructure to political attitudes. 
Finally, since the democracies in these regions are much younger than the traditional 
Western democracies, I believe these regions provide ample comparative insight into the 
various factors that shape how individuals perceive the courts and other democratic 
institutions in general. 
                                                 
4 Benin; Botswana; Burundi; Cape Verde; Ghana; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Malawi; Mali; Mauritius; 
Namibia; Senegal; Sierra Leone; South Africa; Zambia. 
5 Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; El Salvador; Guatemala; 
Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Uruguay. 
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To asses trust in Africa, individuals are asked the following question: “How much 
do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: 
Courts of law?” Responses consist of: “Not at all” (0), “Just a little” (1), “Somewhat” (2), 
and “A lot” (3) (Afrobarometer, 2013).  
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Trust in Courts 
Survey Mean SD Minimum Maximum Range N 
Africa 1.900 1.023 0 3 3 17899 
Latin America 1.020 0.930 0 3 3 15220 
 
In Latin America, judicial trust is measured by asking respondents the following 
questions: “Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in [the 
Judiciary]. Would you say you have a lot (1), some (2), a little (3) or no trust (4)?” 
(Latinobarometer, 2013). I recoded the answers so that higher values mean more trust and 
lower values mean less trust, reflecting the responses in the Afrobarometer (0 = no trust 
at all; 3 = a lot of trust). Figure 1 below displays bar histograms of the number of 
observations in each survey. In Africa (left), approximately one-third of the respondents 
indicated that they had “a lot” of trust in the courts. In contrast, approximately one-third 
of Latin American respondents indicated that they had no trust at all in the judiciary.  
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Figure 1 Trust in the Courts in Africa (left) and Latin America (right) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
My key independent variable is Ethnic Fractionalization (EF). To measure EF, I 
use the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization (HIEF) from Harvard’s Dataverse 
database (Drazanova, 2019).. The HIEF is measured by the probability that two randomly 
drawn individuals within a country are not from the same ethnic group. Values closer to 
zero represent countries with the lowest ethnic fractionalization while values closer to 1 
represent the highest ethnically fractionalized countries (Drazanova, 2019). As such, I 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: As ethnic fractionalization increases, trust in courts decreases. 
I selected this variable because it has been updated over time and is one of the 
most widely used variables in the literature on ethnic diversity and political and economic 
outcomes (see work cited above) (Alesina et al., 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 
2002). I chose not to use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) variable developed by Vogt 
et al. (2015). The EPR variable is primarily used in civil conflict studies and measures 
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ethnic groups’ access to state power, links to rebel organizations, and interethnic 
cleavages. Though it is a reliable variable for the purposes of analyzing ethnic conflict, it 
is beyond the scope of analyzing trust in the legal system. 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Ethnic Fractionalization 
Survey Mean SD Minimum Maximum Range N 
Africa 0.696 0.187 0.308 0.889 0.581 16 
Latin America 0.427 0.181 0.158 0.639 0.481 16 
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Table 3 Ethnic Fractionalization Index Across Country Samples  
Survey and Country Ethnic Fractionalization Index 
Africa  
Benin 0.764 
Botswana 0.395 
Burundi 0.308 
Cape Verde 0.442 
Ghana 0.736 
Kenya 0.855 
Lesotho 0.313 
Liberia 0.889 
Malawi 0.791 
Mali 0.852 
Mauritius 0.466 
Namibia 0.760 
Senegal 0.747 
Sierra Leone 0.801 
South Africa 0.856 
Zambia 0.706 
Latin America  
Argentina 0.158 
Bolivia 0.572 
Brazil 0.559 
Chile 0.439 
Colombia 0.639 
Costa Rica 0.398 
Dominican Republic 0.453 
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El Salvador 0.165 
Guatemala 0.511 
Honduras 0.229 
Mexico 0.587 
Nicaragua 0.544 
Panama 0.612 
Paraguay 0.179 
Peru 0.618 
Uruguay 0.176 
 
Tables 2 and 3 above display descriptive statistics for ethnic fractionalization for 
each survey and the ethnic fractionalization index for each country. The greater 0.269 
difference in the mean in Africa indicates higher levels of ethnic diversity than in Latin 
America. Additionally, the higher range in Africa suggests higher variance in EF in 
Africa than in Latin America. 
Within my models, I expect EF to have a direct negative effect on trust and an 
indirect negative effect on trust through corruption. As such, in addition to controlling for 
corruption in the OLS regression, I run a mediation analysis in R to examine the effect of 
EF and corruption on trust. I expect that corruption will have a partial mediation effect 
between EF and trust in the courts. 
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Table 4 Corruption Perceptions Index Across Country Samples 
Survey and Country Corruption Perceptions Index 
Africa  
Benin 64 
Botswana 36 
Burundi 79 
Cape Verde 42 
Ghana 54 
Kenya 73 
Lesotho 51 
Liberia 62 
Malawi 63 
Mali 72 
Mauritius 48 
Namibia 52 
Senegal 59 
Sierra Leone 70 
South Africa 58 
Zambia 62 
Latin America  
Argentina 66 
Bolivia 66 
Brazil 58 
Chile 29 
Colombia 64 
Costa Rica 47 
Dominican Republic 42 
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El Salvador 62 
Guatemala 71 
Honduras 74 
Mexico 66 
Nicaragua 72 
Panama 65 
Paraguay 76 
Peru 62 
Uruguay 27 
 
To measure corruption, I use the 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from 
Transparency International. The CPI evaluates countries based on how corrupt a 
country’s public sector is perceived to be (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2013). The CPI 
is a composite index, combining surveys, assessments, and polls from numerous 
independent institutions that specialize in governance analysis.6 A country’s corruption 
score is scaled from 0-100, where 0 indicates that a country is most corrupt and a 100 
indicates that a country is perceived as very clean (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2013). 
Though the Afrobarometer and the Latinobarometer ask individuals questions regarding 
judicial corruption and corruption in the national government, respectively, I chose the 
CPI because it is a more uniform measure from a single database and it is a common used 
indicator of global corruption. I used the 2013 dataset rather than a more recent one to 
                                                 
6 Examples of sources include the World Bank, the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, African 
Development Bank Governance Ratings, and Global Insight Country Ratings. 
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match the years of the barometer and the HIEF surveys. I recoded the variable so higher 
values mean more corrupt and lower values mean less corrupt. 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for Corruption 
Survey Mean SD Minimum Maximum Range N 
Africa 59.35 10.57 36 79 43 16 
Latin America 58.86 14.87 27 76 49 16 
 
Tables 4 and 5 above display individual country-level corruption perceptions 
index scores and descriptive statistics for corruption. Though the means in each survey 
are very similar, the standard deviation in Latin America (14.87) is relatively larger than 
in Africa (10.57), indicating greater variance in corruption in Latin America than in 
Africa. 
To test prior findings suggesting that EF is associated with corruption (Cerqueti et 
al., 2012), and that high levels of corruption decrease trust in political institutions 
(Lavallée et al., 2008), I formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2A: As ethnic fractionalization increases, corruption increases. 
Hypothesis 2B: As corruption increases, trust in courts decreases  
Finally, to test the mediation effect, I formulate the following mediation 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2C: Corruption partially mediates the effect of ethnic 
fractionalization on trust in courts. 
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Figure 2 Mediation Effect Diagram 
Control Variables 
I control for other variables associated with trust in political institutions. First, I 
control for Trust in the President and Trust in the Legislature also obtained from the two 
barometer surveys. Generally, respondents that tend to indicate higher levels of trust in 
the executive and legislative branches will reflect the similar levels of trust in other 
institutions (Karakoç, 2013). Like the Trust in the Courts variable, trust in the executive 
and the legislative branches is coded zero for no trust and three for maximum trust. I 
expect that trust in the president and the legislature will positively affect trust in the 
courts. 
Additionally, I control for individual perceptions of Support for Democracy and 
Satisfaction with Democracy. Democratic theory suggests that individuals tend to exhibit 
more trust in democratic governments because of accountability restraints (Hutchison and 
Johnson, 2011). In Africa, democratic support is measured by asking respondents 
whether democracy is preferable to any other type of government; whether it is only 
sometimes preferable to non-democracies; and whether it even matters at all what type of 
Ethnic	Fractionalization Trust	in	the	Courts
Corruption
Indirect
(+)
Indirect
(-)
Direct
(-)
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governments the respondents’ countries have (0 = doesn’t matter; 3 = democracy 
preferable). Democratic satisfaction in Africa is measured by asking respondents: 
“Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the country?” The 
answers range from 0-4 with zero indicating that the country is not a democracy while a 
four indicates that the respondents are very satisfied with democracy. In Latin America, I 
recoded democratic support to reflect the scale in Africa, while democratic satisfaction is 
measured on a scale from 1-4—lowest satisfaction to highest satisfaction. Similarly, I 
control for country-level democratic indicators. I use POLITY IV (2010) indicators to 
control for democracy and the length in years of enduring democracy within the countries 
(POLITY IV, 2010). The POLITY IV (2010) index categorizes countries as democracies 
if they score a 6 or above. I expect that support for and satisfaction with democracy and 
the level and duration of democracy will have positive effects on trust in the courts.  
I also control for two economic indicators—economic satisfaction, and income 
inequality. Prior research that explores levels of political or institutional trust commonly 
controls for economic satisfaction because, generally, higher levels of economic 
satisfaction are associated with higher political trust. Alternatively, economic hardship is 
associated with political distrust (Chi et al., 2013; Helmke, 2010; Hutchison and Johnson, 
2011; Karakoç, 2013; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). Both the Afrobarometer and the 
Latinobarometer ask individuals how satisfied they are with the general national 
economic condition in their countries.  
In Africa, respondents are asked the following question: “In general, how would 
you describe: The present economic condition of this country” (1= Very bad; 5 = Very 
good) (Afrobarometer, 2013). In Latin America, individuals are asked the following 
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question: “In general, how would you describe the country’s present economic 
situation?” (Very bad = 5; Very good = 1) (Latinobarometer, 2013). I recoded the values 
to reflect the Afrobarometer surveys—lower values represent “very bad” perceptions 
while higher values represent “very good” perceptions. I expect that economic 
satisfaction will have a positive effect on trust in courts. 
I also control for Economic Hardship. In line with prior research, I expect that 
individuals experiencing poverty are less likely to trust political institutions (Hutchison 
and Johnson, 2011). In Africa, respondents are asked: “In general, how would you 
describe: Your own present living conditions?” Answers range from 1-5 with 1 indicating 
“very bad” and 5 indicating “very good”. In Latin America, respondents are asked to 
evaluate their “personal current economic situation” with answers ranging from 1-5 with 
1 indicating “very good” and 5 indicating “very bad”. I recoded the values to reflect the 
African survey—lower values indicate poorer conditions and higher values indicate better 
conditions. I expect that respondents in the higher categories will exhibit higher levels of 
trust in the courts. 
Similarly, countries with higher levels of income inequality exhibit lower levels 
of political trust (Chi et al., 2013; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). To control for income 
inequality, I use Solt’s Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID).7 A 
GINI index measures income distribution in a country across income percentiles (Solt, 
                                                 
7 Of the 32 countries, 27 had GINI scores for 2013. To address the missing data in the five countries, I used 
a country’s GINI score from the year nearest to 2013 (Lesotho 2010; Mali 2009; Mauritius 2012; Senegal 
2011; and Sierra Leone 2011).  
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2019). The index ranges from 0-100, where a zero indicates perfect equality and a 100 
indicates perfect inequality. I expect that countries with higher levels of income 
inequality will exhibit lower levels of trust. 
Finally, I control for various demographic indicators—age, gender, education, and 
employment. Prior studies that control for these variables have produced mixed results. 
Some studies have found that older, less educated, and female respondents are more 
likely to trust political institutions, while other studies have refuted that idea (Karakoç, 
2013; Lavallée et al., 2008; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). I expect that employed 
respondents will be more likely to trust the judiciary than those without employment and 
wages. 
Results 
Direct Effect: Ethnic Fractionalization on Trust in the Courts 
Table 6 displays the OLS regression with fixed effects for Africa and Latin 
America.8 For both surveys, I find that ethnic fractionalization is significantly and 
negatively associated with trust in the courts. In Africa, the results of the fixed effects 
OLS regression for EF indicate a coefficient of -1.352, suggesting that, all else equal, an 
increase from the least fractionalized country (Burundi, .308) to the highest fractionalized 
country (Liberia, .889) decreases trust in the courts by 20%. Model 2 displays the results 
for Latin America. The results suggest that, all else equal, an increase from the least 
fractionalized country (Argentina, .158) to the highest fractionalized country (Colombia, 
.639) decreases trust in the courts by 5.4%.  
                                                 
8 See Appendix for country specific data. 
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Table 6 OLS Regression Results 
                                                                      Trust in the Courts 
                                                                                      Model 1                   Model 2 
                                                                                       Africa                 Latin America 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization -1.352***   (0.429) 
 
-0.447**    (0.105) 
Corruption -0.057***   (0.004) 
 
0.001         (0.002) 
Trust in President 0.127***    (0.008) 0.126***   (0.008) 
 
Trust in Legislature 0.286***    (0.008) 0.459***   (0.008) 
 
Economic Satisfaction 0.014***    (0.007) 0.015*       (0.008) 
 
Economic Hardship 0.013*        (0.007) 0.034***   (0.009) 
 
GINI -0.009***   (0.002) 0.019***   (0.006) 
 
POLITY 0.083***    (0.020) 0.127**     (0.052) 
 
Durability -0.017***   (0.004) 0.006**     (0.003) 
 
Support for Democracy -0.001         (0.011) 0.019**     (0.008) 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy 0.071***    (0.008) 0.065***   (0.008) 
 
Age -0.0001       (0.0005) -0.001***  (0.008) 
 
Sex -0.003         (0.013) 0.019         (0.013) 
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Education -0.008*       (0.004) 0.004***   (0.002) 
 
Employment -0.027*       (0.015) -0.33**      (0.013) 
 
Constant 5.554***    (0.349) -1.914***  (0.546) 
 
 
Observations                                                                                             17,899                                             15,220            
R2                                                                                                              0.240                                               0.366            
Adjusted R2                                                                                              0.239                                               0.365            
Residual Std. Error                                                                        0.893 (df = 17873)                          0.741 (df = 
15194)      
F Statistic                                                                              226.247*** (df = 25; 17873)            350.177*** (df = 
25; 15194) 
==================================================================================
========= 
Note:   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
The fixed effects OLS regression confirms my main hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) 
and the effect of EF on trust in the courts achieves statistical significance. Comparing the 
two surveys, it can be inferred that the higher substantive effect in Africa is due to a 
higher range of variance in ethnic fractionalization.  
Control Variables 
As expected, an increase in corruption has a negative effect on trust in courts in 
Africa. Achieving statistical significance with a coefficient of -0.057, the results suggests 
that an increase from the least corrupted country (Botswana with a value of 36) to the 
highest corrupted country (Burundi with a value of 79) decreases trust in the courts by 
61%. In contrast, corruption in Latin America unexpectedly has virtually no effect on 
trust in the courts within the OLS regression model (.001). 
As for the individual-level control variables, trust in the president and the 
legislature are positively and significantly associated with trust in the courts in both 
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models. In both Africa and Latin America, an increase from the least trust to the highest 
trust (0-3), results in a 10% increase in trust in the courts. However, while an increase in 
trust in the legislature increases trust in the courts in Africa by 21%, trust in the 
legislature in Latin America increases trust in the courts by 34%. 
Additionally, as expected, respondents that were satisfied with the economy and 
were not experiencing economic hardship are also more likely to trust the courts. In 
Africa, an increase from not being satisfied with the economy to being very satisfied (1-
5) and moving from the worst economic hardship to a positive economic status (1-5), 
increases trust in the courts by 1%. In Latin America, economic satisfaction also 
increases trust in the courts by 1% while those not experiencing economic hardship are 
3% more likely to exhibit trust in the courts. 
Similarly, respondents that were satisfied with democracy also exhibited higher 
levels of trust in the courts in both surveys. In Africa, increasing democratic satisfaction 
from the least satisfied to most satisfied (0-4) resulted in a 7% increase in trust in the 
courts. In Latin America, democratic satisfaction increases trust in the courts by 5%. 
However, support for democracy in Africa is negatively but insignificantly associated 
with trust in the courts. In contrast, support for democracy positively and strongly affects 
trust in the courts in Latin America, but the increase is less than 1%. 
As for the country-level indicators, as expected, income inequality is negatively 
and significantly associated with trust in the courts in Africa. An increase from the 
country with the least inequality (Liberia, 36.8) to the country with the highest inequality 
(Namibia, 65.1) results in a 6% decrease in trust in the courts. Unexpectedly, higher 
levels of income inequality positively and significantly increase trust in the courts in 
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Latin America. An increase in income inequality from the country with least inequality 
(Uruguay, 36.6) to the country with the highest levels of inequality (Honduras, 48.7) 
increases trust in the courts by 6%. 
Democracy (polity) is positively and significantly associated with trust in the 
courts in both surveys as expected with democratic theory. An increase from the least 
democratic countries to the highest democratic countries results in an 8% increase in trust 
in the courts in Africa and a 10% increase in trust in the courts in Latin America. 
However, democratic durability (years as democracy) negatively affects trust in the 
courts in Africa—a decrease by 17%—and positively affects trust in the courts in Latin 
America—an increase by 12%. 
Finally, in congruence with prior research, demographic variables produced 
mixed results. In Africa, age and sex did not have a meaningful impact on judicial trust 
while those that were more educated tended to exhibit lower levels of trust in the courts. 
In Latin America, older respondents exhibited negative and significant levels of trust in 
the courts while gender has no meaningful impact on the dependent variable. In contrast 
to Africa, respondents with more years of education in Latin America exhibited positive 
and significant levels of trust. Lastly, employed respondents exhibited negative and 
significant levels of trust in the courts in both surveys.  
Indirect Effect: Corruption Mediation 
Following Baron and Kenny (1986), I took multiple steps to assess the effect of 
ethic fractionalization on trust and the mediating effect that ethnic fractionalization has 
on trust through corruption. I outline this process in Tables 7 and 9 below for Africa and 
Tables 9 and 10 for Latin America.  
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In Africa, the first step begins with a basic regression of ethnic fractionalization’s 
direct effect on trust in the courts without the corruption variable to test for significance. 
After achieving statistical significance with a coefficient of -0.439 in step one, the second 
step requires a significant relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the mediating 
variable—corruption. The regression results indicate that ethnic fractionalization has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on corruption with a coefficient of 22.574—
confirming Hypothesis 2A. The third step consists of a regression analysis with ethnic 
fractionalization as the main independent variable with the addition of corruption. The 
effect of EF on trust in the courts should be smaller in magnitude than the initial effect in 
step one. Here, the coefficient of EF decreased from -0.439 to -0.261 with the addition of 
corruption as the mediating variable—suggesting partial mediation. Additionally, step 3 
confirms Hypothesis 2B, that an increase in corruption leads to a decrease in trust in the 
courts.  
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Table 7 Mediation Analysis Africa 
 Step 1 
DV: Trust in Courts 
Step 2 
DV: Corruption 
Step 3: 
DV: Trust in Courts 
 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
 
-0.439*** 
(0.041) 
 
 
22.574*** 
(0.387) 
 
-0.261*** 
(0.044) 
Corruption   -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 
Constant 2.203*** 
(0.029 
43.663*** 
(0.279) 
2.547*** 
(0.045) 
 
=============================================================== 
Observations                                            17,899                                     17,899                                        17,899           
R2                                                             0.006                                       0.159                                          0.012            
Adjusted R2                                              0.006                                       0.159                                          0.012            
Residual Std. Error                       1.020 (df = 17897)                    9.708 (df = 17897)                    1.017 (df = 
17896)     
F Statistic                             116.095*** (df = 1; 17897)     3395.919*** (df = 1; 17897)      109.043*** (df = 2; 
17896) 
=============================================================== 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Finally, after confirming the mediation effect through regression, I ran a 
bootstrapping method to produce the mediation effect results (see Table 8 below). The 
Total Effect in the results (-0.439) is the total effect of ethnic fractionalization on trust in 
the courts without the corruption mediator (step 1). The Average Direct Effect (ADE) of -
0.261 is the direct effect of ethnic fractionalization on trust in the courts after accounting 
for corruption as the mediator (step 3). Finally, the Average Causal Mediation Effects 
(ACME) subtracts the direct effect from the total effect (-0.439 + 0.261  = -0.178), which 
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equals to a product of a coefficient of ethnic fractionalization in step 2 and a coefficient 
of corruption in step 3 (-0.0078845 x 22.5738 = -0.17798313). By obtaining this indirect 
effect with statistical significance, the results confirm Hypothesis 2C, that ethnic 
fractionalization reduces trust in the courts through partial mediation of corruption. 
Table 8 Mediation Results Africa 
 Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value 
ACME -0.178 -0.213 -0.14 0.000 *** 
ADE -0.261 -0.342 -0.17 0.000 *** 
Total Effect -0.439 -0.511 -0.36 0.000 *** 
Prop. Mediated 0.406 0.303 0.53 0.000 *** 
==========================================================================
=== 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Sample Size Used: 17899  
Simulations: 500 
 
In Latin America (Table 9 below), the regression model achieved statistical 
significance between EF and trust in courts with a coefficient of -0.178. In step 2, I 
confirmed Hypothesis 2A—EF has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
corruption with a coefficient of 10.888. The third step displayed a decrease in the effect 
of EF from -0.178 to -0.110 when mediating through corruption. Step 3 also confirmed 
Hypothesis 2B—that an increase in corruption leads to a decrease in trust in the courts. 
After running a bootstrapping simulation (Table 10 below), the ACME produced a 
mediation effect of -0.688, confirming Hypothesis 2C: that ethnic fractionalization 
reduces trust in the courts through partial mediation of corruption. 
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Table 9 Mediation Analysis Latin America 
 Step 1 
DV: Trust in Courts 
Step 2 
DV: Corruption 
Step 3: 
DV: Trust in Courts 
 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
 
-0.178*** 
(0.042) 
 
 
10.188*** 
(0.661) 
 
-0.110*** 
(0.042) 
 
Corruption   -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
 
Constant 1.096*** 
(0.019 
54.517*** 
(0.306) 
1.464*** 
(0.034) 
 
==========================================================================
== 
Observations                                             15,220                                  15,220                                          15,220           
R2                                                               0.001                                    0.015                                            0.013           
Adjusted R2                                                0.001                                    0.015                                            0.013           
Residual Std. Error                           0.929 (df = 15218)            14.760 (df = 15218)                       0.924 (df = 15217)     
F Statistic                    18.361*** (df = 1; 15218)             237.321*** (df = 1; 15218)             98.003*** (df = 2; 
15217) 
==================================================================================
=== 
Note:  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 10 Mediation Results Latin America 
 Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value 
ACME -0.0688 -0.0843 -0.06 0.000 *** 
ADE -0.1095 -0.1866 -0.02       0.000 
* 
Total Effect -0.1784 -0.2537 -0.10 0.000 *** 
Prop. Mediated 0.3860 0.2595 0.74 0.000 *** 
==========================================================================
=== 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Sample Size Used: 15220  
Simulations: 500 
 
Country Examples 
Exploring cross-country differences is one way future research may want to 
improve our understanding of ethnic fractionalization and trust in the courts. Nonetheless, 
a brief examination of some of the countries within Africa and Latin America could be 
helpful in further developing how ethnic diversity affects trust. This section serves this 
purpose. 
Mali 
The raw data indicate that Mali is has the lowest level of trust in Africa’s samples. 
About 28% of the respondents expressed that they had no trust at all in the courts. The EF 
index for Mali is .852, which is well above the average of .696 and near the highest level 
of .889 (Liberia). Its CPI is 72, the third highest in Africa. Since its independence from 
France in 1960, Mali has been in a constant state of tension: military coups, ethnic 
violence, civil conflict, and phases of authoritarian rule. Of course, ethnic 
fractionalization is not the causal factor of these consequences—but ethnic violence is a 
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recurring issue in the country. In 2019, ethnic violence led to the collapse of Mali’s 
government and the resignation of its Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga and his 
cabinet. Ethnic tensions between the Dogon and the Fulani people exacerbated the ethnic 
conflict and violence within the country. The Fulani were suspected of supporting 
jihadists, while the Dogon group created a militia to counter the jihadist influence in the 
region. In March 2019, conflict between the two groups escalated, resulting in 160 
deaths. Since 2018, 600 lives have been claimed by ethnic violence (France-Presse, 
2019).  
It is no surprise that Mali’s respondents had the least amount of trust in the courts. 
Though caution should be exercised in attributing the lack of trust to ethnic 
fractionalization, Mali’s larger political context and ethnic violence plays a large role in 
citizens’ attitudes. Experiences with other political arrangements typically spill over into 
the judicial context. Thus, the negative consequences of ethnic fractionalization in other 
contexts in Mali also affect individual levels of trust in the judicial system. 
Botswana 
It can be said that Botswana is the opposite case of Mali. Botswana is one of the 
countries with the highest levels of trust in the courts at 42%. Additionally, Botswana is 
one of the least fractionalized countries with an EF index at .395, well below the .696 
average. Botswana is also the least corrupt country in the African survey with a CPI of 
36, well below the 59.35 average. In political and social science literature, Botswana is 
often deemed the model country in Africa in terms of democratization and development 
(Samatar, 1997). Since its independence in 1966, Botswana has consistently maintained a 
stable democracy, upheld the rule of law, and made many economic advancements.  
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Botswana’s high levels of trust are not exclusively due to its low EF score. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that prior research suggests that one key element in 
Botswana’s political and economic successes is largely due to Botswana’s policies 
towards ethnic inclusion and reducing ethnic tensions (Carroll and Carroll, 1997; 
Samatar, 1997; Werbner, 2002). These policies consist of promoting minority ethnicities 
in small businesses and entrepreneurship opportunities; ethnically inclusive political 
policies; and other economic and development policies that explicitly address problems 
of ethnic tensions. Though these examples do not specifically relate to trust in the legal 
system, it would be reasonable to expect how the state interests behind these policies can 
be carried over to the judicial system.  
Peru 
In Latin America, Peru placed second as the country with the least amount of trust 
in the courts. Nearly half (49%) of Peru’s citizens indicated that they had no trust at all in 
the courts. Peru’s EF index ranks the second highest in the Latin American survey at 
.618, well above the .427 regional average. Historically, Peru’s case is similar to that of 
Mali. Peru has experienced military rule and, even with the return to democracy, there is 
constant political violence, guerilla activity, and urban terrorism. Much of this has been 
attributed to ethnic tensions between various Indigenous tribes. Ethnic tensions in Peru 
have increased the spread of guerilla threats, political conflict, and inequality (Bourque 
and Warren, 1989; Cott, 2006; Figueroa and Barrón, 2005; García, 2003; Thorp et al., 
2006).  
In the judicial context, low confidence in Peru’s judicial system led multiple 
Indigenous tribes to create their own informal legal systems to resolve disputes (Cott, 
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2006). Though these informal institutions were initially effective in protecting against 
theft and other petty criminal activity, many yielded severe punishment and cruelty in 
sentencing. The long-term effects of such informal institutions undermines judicial 
legitimacy and credibility. More recently, Helmke (2010) provides evidence showing that 
low public support in the courts is correlated with political attacks against judges, 
arbitrary removals of judges, and court packing in Peru. It is no surprise that nearly half 
of Peru’s population exhibits such low levels of trust in the courts. One key element in 
that observation is ethnic fractionalization. 
Conclusion 
My results strongly suggest that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on 
trust in the courts. Additionally, EF indirectly decreases trust in the courts through the 
mediation of corruption. Although cross-country differences may yield particularities in 
the causal factors in the relationship between high diversity and low levels of trust in the 
legal system, one implication of this study is that ethnically divided societies can focus 
on ethnically inclusive policy making within the legal system and the political 
institutional context in general. Future research is best at parsing out the specifics of such 
policies.  
By linking ethnic fractionalization to low levels of trust in the courts, this study 
proposes various theoretical contributions to the literature on ethnic fractionalization and 
political institutions in general. But particularly, it offers insight into the possible reasons, 
i.e., ethnic favoritism, for why individuals exhibit lowers level of trust in ethnically 
divided societies. In terms of ethnic fractionalization and corruption, this study confirms 
prior findings of the positive association between EF and corruption, and corruption and 
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low levels of institutional trust. But it also adds to this line of literature by closing the 
circle between the three variables through mediation theory.  
Future research may want to focus on how differences in legal traditions in the 
sampled countries may influence levels of trust in the courts in the context of high ethnic 
fractionalization. Touchton (2013) accounts for this variable in the context of rule of law, 
but it may be valuable to an inquiry in trust in the courts. In Latin America, every country 
practices the Civil Law tradition with the exception of the Republic of Guyana. In Africa, 
the democratic institutions are much younger and it has a much more diverse colonial 
history, legal traditions range from Common Law to Civil Law and to mixed legal 
systems.  
Judges in Civil Law systems enforce legislative codes and do not establish 
precedent. In contrast, Common Law judges have the power to establish binding 
precedents that can have a substantial impact on citizens. Theoretically, this feature 
implies that judges in Civil Law systems are not as insulated and independent as 
Common Law judges (Touchton, 2013). As a consequence, it is reasonable to expect that 
judges in the Common Law systems are more likely to uphold the rule of law and protect 
individuals because of the difficulties in overturning precedent, potentially increasing the 
levels of trust in the courts—assuming that precedent is not biased against certain ethnic 
groups. Future research can focus on this theoretical expectation and utilize available data 
to test whether legal tradition features impact individual-level trust in the courts. 
Finally, additional country-specific case-analysis could provide valuable insight 
of cross-country differences since many of the countries sampled in this paper have 
different ethnic groups. By taking into consideration the ethnically diverse socio-
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economic contexts across the country, policymakers could avoid overgeneralizing 
institutional solutions. Country-specific studies could bring to light the social, economic, 
and cultural factors that may or may not impact the ways in which individuals interact 
with the courts and institutions in general. 
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APPENDIX A 
Country Specific Effects 
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OLS Regression Results: Country Effects 
                                                                      Trust in the Courts 
                                                                          Model 1                  Model 2 
                                                                          Africa                Latin America 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization -1.352***   (0.429) 
 
-0.447**    (0.105) 
Corruption -0.057***   (0.004) 
 
0.001         (0.002) 
Trust in President 0.127***    (0.008) 0.126***   (0.008) 
 
Trust in Legislature 0.286***    (0.008) 0.459***   (0.008) 
 
Economic Satisfaction 0.014***    (0.007) 0.015*       (0.008) 
 
Economic Hardship 0.013*        (0.007) 0.034***   (0.009) 
 
GINI -0.009***   (0.002) 0.019***   (0.006) 
 
POLITY 0.083***    (0.020) 0.127**     (0.052) 
 
Durability -0.017***   (0.004) 0.006**     (0.003) 
 
Support for Democracy -0.001         (0.011) 0.019**     (0.008) 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy 0.071***    (0.008) 0.065***   (0.008) 
 
Age -0.0001       (0.0005) -0.001***  (0.008) 
 
Sex -0.003         (0.013) 0.019         (0.013) 
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Education -0.008*       (0.004) 0.004***   (0.002) 
 
Employment -0.027*       (0.015) -0.33**      (0.013) 
 
Botswana 
 
Burundi 
 
Cape Verde 
 
Ghana 
 
Kenya 
 
Lesotho 
 
Liberia 
 
Malawi 
 
Mali 
 
Mauritius 
 
Bolivia 
 
Brazil 
 
Chile 
 
Colombia 
 
Costa Rica 
 
Dominican Republic 
-1.180***    (0.253) 
 
0.061           (0.184) 
 
-1.598***    (0.211) 
 
-0.804***   (0.055) 
 
0.625***    (0.050) 
 
-1.158***   (0.023) 
 
-0.336***   (0.100) 
 
0.726***    (0.039) 
 
0.439***    (0.062) 
 
-0.734***   (0.269 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.177          (0.111) 
 
0.437***    (0.080) 
 
-0.254***   (0.051) 
 
0.100          (0.169) 
 
-0.006         (0.196) 
 
0.144          (0.100) 
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El Salvador 
 
Guatemala 
 
Honduras 
 
Mexico 
 
Nicaragua 
 
Panama 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.554***    (0.349) 
 
-0.038         (-0.038) 
 
0.293***    (0.045) 
 
-0.062         (0.084) 
 
0.228***    (0.057) 
 
-1.914***   (0.546) 
   
 
Observations                                                                                             17,899                                             
15,220            
R2                                                                                                              0.240                                               
0.366            
Adjusted R2                                                                                              0.239                                               0.365            
Residual Std. Error                                                                        0.893 (df = 17873)                          0.741 (df = 
15194)      
F Statistic                                                                              226.247*** (df = 25; 17873)            350.177*** (df 
= 25; 15194) 
===============================================================================
============ 
Note:   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
